[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 78(4) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2007-17405-001). The graph in the upper panel, “Low NC Participants,” was incorrect. The corrected figure in its entirety appears in this erratum.] Positive and negative moods have been shown to increase likelihood estimates of future events matching these states in valence (e.g., E. J. Johnson and A. Tversky, 1983). In the present article, 4 studies provide evidence that this congruency bias (1) is not limited to valence but functions in an emotion-specific manner, (2) derives from the informational value of emotions, and (3) is not the inevitable outcome of likelihood assessment under heightened emotion. Specifically, Study 1 demonstrates that sadness and anger, 2 distinct, negative emotions, differentially bias likelihood estimates of sad and angering events. Studies 2 and 3 replicate this finding in addition to supporting an emotion-as-information (cf. N. Schwarz and G. L. Clore, 1983), as opposed to a memory-based, mediating process for the bias. Finally, Study 4 shows that when the source of the emotion is salient, a reversal of the bias can occur given greater cognitive effort aimed at accuracy.