This paper advances an “information goods” theory that explains prestige processes as an emergent product of psychological adaptations that evolved to improve the quality of information acquired via cultural transmission. Natural selection favored social learners who could evaluate potential models and copy the most successful among them. In order to improve the fidelity and comprehensiveness …
Category Archives: 연구논문
Luttmer, E. F. (2005). Neighbors as negatives: Relative earnings and well-being. The Quarterly journal of economics, 120(3), 963-1002.
This paper investigates whether individuals feel worse off when others around them earn more. In other words, do people care about relative position, and does “lagging behind the Joneses” diminish well-being? To answer this question, I match individual-level data containing various indicators of well-being to information about local average earnings. I find that, controlling for …
Romer, T., &Rosenthal, H. (1978). Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo. Public choice, 33(4), 27-43.
Financial support was provided, in part, by The Spencer Foundation. We thank M. Harris, J. Lave, S. Salop, and participants in workshops at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and at Queen’s University for helpful comments. Romer, T., &Rosenthal, H. (1978). Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo. Public …
Romer, T., &Rosenthal, H. (1982). Median voters or budget maximizers: Evidence from school expenditure referenda. Economic Inquiry, 20(4), 556-578.
Some readers may have found these results of greater interest were we able to confirm the directional hypotheses of the certainty setter model in addition to finding that spending is “related” to the reversion – the much weaker prediction of the uncertainty model. Yet the failure of the certainty When base elections were optional, …
Weingast, B. R., &Moran, M. J. (1983). Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission. Journal of Political Economy, 91(5), 765-800.
This paper extends Stigler and Peltzman’s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature. The model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications. The paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior. The first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion; the second assumes that Congress controls agency …
Olson, M. (1969). The principle of” fiscal equivalence”: the division of responsibilities among different levels of government.
초록 없음 Olson, M. (1969). The principle of” fiscal equivalence”: the division of responsibilities among different levels of government. The American economic review, 479-487.
Vaubel, R. (1994). The political economy of centralization and the European Community. Public Choice, 81(1-2), 151-190.
Since 1972, the share of central government expenditure in total public expenditure has continued to increase in most industrial countries. In an international cross-section analysis, it has a significant positive effect on the share of government spending in GDP. The actors who have an interest in centralization are analyzed. The dynamics of centralization are attributed …
Kirchgässner, G., &Pommerehne, W. W. (1996). Tax harmonization and tax competition in the European Union: Lessons from Switzerland. Journal of Public Economics, 60(3), 351-371.
This paper presents empirical evidence on individual income tax competition in Switzerland. Tax competition has some influence on the spread of people with high income over the cantons, and it is partly capitalised in dwelling rents. However, it neither leads to a collapse of public good supply nor makes redistribution by the fiscal authorities impossible. …
Ashworth, J., Heyndels, B., &Smolders, C. (2002). Redistribution as a local public good: an empirical test for Flemish municipalities. Kyklos, 55(1), 27-56.
Redistribution is typically viewed as a task of the central government. However, in most federal countries local governments do have some discretion in redistribution policy. The main theoretical argument for this is that redistribution may be a local public good (Pauly 1973). Using data on Flemish municipalities, we present a first empirical test of Pauly’s …
Buchanan, J. M. (1965). An economic theory of clubs. Economica, 32(125), 1-14.
초록 없음 Buchanan, J. M. (1965). An economic theory of clubs. Economica, 32(125), 1-14. https://doi.org/10.2307/2552442