Vaubel, R. (1994). The political economy of centralization and the European Community. Public Choice, 81(1-2), 151-190.

Since 1972, the share of central government expenditure in total public expenditure has continued to increase in most industrial countries. In an international cross-section analysis, it has a significant positive effect on the share of government spending in GDP. The actors who have an interest in centralization are analyzed. The dynamics of centralization are attributed to a response asymmetry and two thresholds. “Popitz’ law” of the attraction of the larger budget is tested with respect to the EC Commission: high-ranking politicians come mainly from the smaller member states. The voters’ attitudes toward European unification are analyzed in a pooled regression.

Ten years hence, 80% of our economic legislation, and perhaps even our fiscal and social legislation as well, will be of Community origin

 

 

Vaubel, R. (1994). The political economy of centralization and the European Community. Public Choice, 81(1-2), 151-190. 

https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053271