서울대학교 행복연구센터

서울대학교 행복연구센터

Boskin, M. J., & Sheshinski, E. (1978). Optimal redistributive taxation when individual welfare depends upon relative income. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 92(4), 589-601.

I. Introduction, 589. — II. An optimal negative income tax model, 591. — III. The maximin criterion, 594. — IV. A utilitarian social objective, 597. — V. Conclusion, 598. Our theory … depends upon the validity of a single hypothesis, viz.: that the utility index is a function of relative rather than absolute consumption expenditure. — J. Duesenberry Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer...

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Sobel, J. (2005). Interdependent preferences and reciprocity. Journal of economic literature, 43(2), 392-436.

Experiments, ethnography, and introspection provide evidence economic agents do not act to maximize their narrowly defined self interest. Expanding the domain of preferences to include the utility of others provides a coherent way to extend rational choice theory.There are two approaches for including extended or social preferences in strategic models. One posits that agents have extended preferences, but maintains the conventional assumption that these preferences...

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Akerlof, G. A., &Kranton, R. E. (2005). Identity and the Economics of Organizations. Journal of Economic perspectives, 19(1), 9-32.

The economics of organizations is replete with the pitfalls of monetary rewards and punishments to motivate workers. If economic incentives do not work, what does? This paper proposes that workers' self-image as jobholders, coupled with their ideal as to how their job should be done, can be a major work incentive. It shows how such identities can flatten reward schedules, as they solve "principal-agent" problem....

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Fehr, E., &Schmidt, K. (2001). Theories of fairness and reciprocity-evidence and economic applications. Advances in Economics and Econometrics.

Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. Moreover, several theoretical Papers have been written showing that the observed phenomena can be explained...

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Fehr, E., &Gächter, S. (2000). Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity. Journal of economic perspectives, 14(3), 159-181.

This paper shows that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic domains. It is an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances the possibilities of collective action greatly. Reciprocity may render the provision of explicit incentive inefficient because the incentives may crowd out voluntary co-operation. It strongly limits the effects of competition in markets with incomplete contracts and gives rise...

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Fehr, E., &Gächter, S. (1998). Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans1.European economic review, 42(3-5), 845-859.

A large number of studies suggest that reciprocity constitutes a basic motivational drive. This paper shows that reciprocity can account for a wide range of empirical phenomena: It (1) is a powerful effort elicitation device, (2) explains why employers refuse to hire underbidders and, hence, why wages are downwardly rigid, (3) gives rise to non-compensating wage differentials and to a positive correlation between profits and...

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Schwarze, J., &Winkelmann, R. (2005). What can happiness research tell us about altruism? Evidence from the German Socio-Economic Panel. Discussion Paper 1487, IZA (Institute for the Study of Labor).

Much progress has been made in recent years on developing and applying a direct measure of utility using survey questions on subjective well-being. In this paper we explore whether this new type of measurement can be fruitfully applied to the study of interdependent utility in general, and altruism between parents and children in particular. We introduce an appropriate econometric methodology and, using data from the...

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Osterloh, M., &Frey, B. (2003). Corporate governance for crooks? The case for corporate virtue. Corporate Governance and Firm Organization

Corporate scandals are reflected in excessive top management compensation and fraudulent accounts. These scandals cause an enormous amount of damage, not only to the companies affected, but also to the market economy as a whole. As a solution, conventional wisdom suggests more monitoring and sanctioning of management. We argue that these efforts will create a governance structure for crooks. Instead of solving the problem, they...

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